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Abstract
This paper provides historical and empirical arguments that can explain
the development of the Egyptian informal sector. After recalling the various
approaches proposed in the literature, it identifies the configuration that over-
rides the Egyptian labor market by allowing for the heterogeneity of informal
jobs and therefore the existence of different segments within the informal sec-
tor using a mixture model. It concludes that the Egyptian informal labor
market in 2006 was composed of two segments with a distinct wage equations.
This may point to the existence of barriers to entry to each sector, e.g. fixed
cost related to social stigma which prevent people from working in the sector
which offers them the highest expected wage.
JEL codes: O17, J42
Keywords: Informal market, Development Economics, Finite mixture model,
Egypt, Segmentation, selection bias
Re´sume´
Ce papier fournit des arguments historiques et empiriques dont le but
est d’expliquer le de´veloppement du secteur informel en Egypte. Apre`s avoir
rappele´ les diffe´rentes approches propose´es dans la litte´rature, il identifie la
configuration du marche´ du travail e´gyptien tout en permettant l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´
des emplois informels et donc l’existence de diffe´rents segments du secteur
informel en utilisant un mode`le de me´lange. Il conclut que le marche´ du travail
e´gyptien informel en 2006 e´tait compose´ de deux segments ayant chacun une
e´quation de salaires distincts. Ceci peut indiquer l’existence de barrie`res a`
l’entre´e a` chaque secteur, par exemple, des couˆts fixes lie´s a` la stigmatisation
sociale qui empeˆchent les gens de travailler dans le secteur qui leur offre le
plus haut salaire espe´re´.
Codes JEL: O17, J42
Mots clefs: Economie informelle, de´veloppement, mode`le de me´lange, Egypte, Seg-
mentation, Biais de se´lection
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1 Introduction
All studies agree on the large size of the Egyptian informal market which has
grown fast over the last decades and was often ignored. Schneider (2011) measure
of the share of informal employment in total non agricultural employment in Egypt
is 45.9% between 2000 and 2007. Also the ILO statistical update on employment
in the informal economy estimated this share to 51.2%. It is important to know
what is the configuration that overrides the Egyptian labor market, the nature of
the informal economy, are workers obliged to work informally or is it their choice?
in order for policy makers to take adequate policy decisions.
In Egypt, each enterprise, according to the type of its activity, has to obtain a
number of permits from concerned ministries. A small coffee shop must have permits
from certain departments in the Ministries of Health, Tourism, Internal Trade and
Industry as well as the District Authority. Despite the fact that such laws, rules and
regulations may appear simple to undertake, practice proves otherwise. Completing
any of the previous steps or conditions is both expensive and extremely time consum-
ing. Some ongoing research suggests that it could take an enterprise up to one year
to complete these procedures. Djankov and al. (2002) after analysing the regulation
of entry in 85 countries including Egypt, concluded that heavier regulation of entry
is generally associated with greater corruption and a larger unofficial economy. The
whole regulatory and institutional set-up does not create an enabling environment
for small enterprises. Therefore, it is wiser and more rational to sidestep them and
operate informally. Moreover, the informal nature of firms impose informal contracts
for its workers because there is no possibility to sign a contract or to be assigned
with a social security program.
Many studies focused mostly on the actual size of the informal sector such as
Schneider(1986), but other questions started to interest researchers and mainly the
question of choice or obligation of workers to belong to the informal sector, i.e.
whether the difference in earnings in the formal and informal sectors is the result
of market segmentation or whether competitive labor market theories hold for the
informal sector. The answer to this question is key to understanding labor market
and giving sound policy recommendations.
The dominant approach explaining the existence of informal employment is based
on the idea that the labor market is segmented into a formal primary market with
high earnings and stable conditions of work, and an informal secondary market
where all those without access to the primary market find themselves. This describes
informal employment as a job of last resort in order to escape unemployment. Within
this framework, any worker employed in the informal sector, will chose to work in
the formal sector if he has the choice. This is the traditional dual labor market
theory argued by Fields (1990) and Lewis (1954). After the monumental changes
came to Peru as a result of the rural population’s migration to the urban areas, De
Soto (1989) explained the reason why migrants became informal: “if they were to
live, manufacture, trade, transport, or even consume, the city’s new inhabitants had
to do so illegaly”. This labor market dualism is what has been called labor market
segmentation or fragmentation. On the other hand, Maloney (2004) in his study on
Latin America refutes the dualism view citing many reasons for workers to choose
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voluntarily being “unprotected” (by a formal contract) and to rely more on informal
safety nets in absence of medical insurance or saving for retirement in developing
countries.
Each of these points of view treats the informal sector as homogeneous, assum-
ing free entry and no segmentation of labor market. Other economists had different
point of views: Hart (1973) enumerated many informal income opportunities de-
scribing them as legitimate, and emphasizing the diversity of jobs in this sector, also
Fields (1975) contended what empirical researchers label ”the informal sector” is best
represented not as one sector nor as a continuum but as two qualitatively distinct
sectors, it is only recently that economists have started to accept the hypothesis
of heterogeneity in the informal sector. Fields (2005) presented 3 characterizations
of informal sector labor markets: the informal economy as a last resort sector, the
informal economy as a desirable sector and finally, an informal economy with its own
internal dualism combining the first two.
Other prominent examples are Gu¨nther and Launov (2012), that studied the
labor market in Cote-d’Ivoire using finite mixture of regression models to detect
unobserved heterogeneity of informal employment opportunities, and Bensidoun and
Bensalem (2011) who applied this same approach to Turkish data.
These different paradigms show several configurations of the labor market that
can be structured around the following questions: Are informal jobs heterogeneous?
Is the labor market segmented or competitive? Can we detect a voluntary component
in informal jobs? In response, following Gu¨nther and Launov (2012) approach,
we mobilize a finite mixture of regression models. This model provides consistent
estimates of returns to individual characteristics within any of the segments of the
informal sector, accounting for selection bias in the labor market. It also provides an
intuitive approach to identify the size of voluntary and involuntary employment in
the informal sector. The identification strategy relies on an implicit assumption that
individuals strive to maximize their earnings: the fact that some individuals do not
switch to the sector where they can earn more, indicates under this assumption to
some constraints to free choice. However this assumption may be easily criticized as
too restrictive, the microeconomic tradition assuming people to be utility maximizers
in general instead of earning maximizers.
We contribute to the existing litterature on the informal market, by building up
on the Gu¨nther and Launov approach to push further interpretations of heterogeneity
of informal employment. Using the estimated finite mixture of regressions model, we
calculate the probability that an individual belongs to a specified sector conditional
on the observed earnings, and therefore define the segment of the labor market to
which each individual belongs with a high degree of probability. Thus classifying
individuals, we take a look at average characteristics of agents employed in each
segment and therefore get to shed some light on their motivations.
On the other hand we add to the mass of studies of Egyptian informal economy,
where little empirical work has been done and the most of contributors considered
employment in the informal sector as a forced choice, a means of last resort of avoid-
ing unemployment: Moawad (2009) considered the informal economy as an engine for
poverty reduction and development in Egypt, finding that the informal enterprises
in Egypt constitute 82% of the total number of economic units and the informally
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employed - 40% of the total labor force. When linking informality and poverty,
he concluded that the ratio of poverty is shocking in Egypt but being involved in
the informal sector is better than not working at all. Galal (2004) tried to explain
why Egyptian entrepreneurs choose to stay informal and assessed the likely wel-
fare impact of formalization on different economic agents using a partial equilibrium
model, concluding that under the current regulatory framework, formalization is not
sociably desirable, although the potential net benefits of formalization may become
positive conditional on reforms implementation. This result is in line with Loewe
(2000), which stated that informality can simply result from tax evasion because of
the unequal and inefficient social security system and low returns to contributions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: some essential facts and major
historical and legal change in the Egyptian labor market are discussed in section 2;
section 3 discusses the econometric issues and the specification of the mixture model;
in section 4, we give the description of data and discuss results; section 5 concludes.
2 History of the legal status in the Egyptian labor
market
The first step to understand the importance, the size and the development of the
informal economy in Egypt is to have a good look in the history, at the evolution of
the labor market, and how it was affected by some global and regional crisis and by
the government decisions during the past years. Al Mahdi (2005) emphasized the
importance of the law 14 in 1964 which gave responsibility for the state to hire all
graduate students from university and secondary school in government offices or in
state owned companies within two or three years after the graduation, this was a
populist economic policy which aimed at achieving social welfare in the form of free
education, free health service, employment for everyone at the age of work, so the
economic growth was sustained.
During the 70’s, Egypt was still instable not concentrating on its own economy
but on its war against Israel. It is only after the camp David accord in 1978 that
the Egyptian government started investing in the infrastructure.
In 1986 the country suffered from a serious budget deficit, balance of payments
deficits, high inflation rate and high interest rate. Furthermore, the public sector
had a very poor performance and the country was highly undebted. With these
shortcomings, reforms were urgent.
In 1991, the government signed an agreement with the international Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to start the Economic Reform Structural and
Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in order to correct the macroeconomic imbalances,
privatizes the public sector, liberalize the foreign trade and adjust the exchange rate.
Until now, It was the public sector and especially the government the main employer.
The reform objective was to reduce the wage bill in order to cut the budget deficit. It
is the private sector which has to be open for more job opportunities, and it became
harder to find a job after graduation because there is no certainty that the public
sector will hire, and the private sector employers started using this advantage to
put hard conditions on workers. The ERSAP achieved good results in reducing the
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budget deficit and the balance of payments deficit, it also stabilized the exchange
rate and privatized most of the public sector units. But the ERSAP had also some
negative consequences on employment. As Moawad (2009) explained, new entrants
with no or low education, also some of those who were working in the public sector
and lost their jobs, found no other option but to work informally. Therefore the
informal sector was a large job absorber. So even though this program was well
evaluated by the African development Bank, there is no evidence of labor allocation
in the private and formal sectors (Wahba and McComick (2003)).
In 2003, some economic reforms were implemented stated by the law 12 which
contains 257 articles that addresses the regulation of the Egyptian labor market. It
aims to increase employment in the private sector. According to this law, private sec-
tor employers can renew a temporary contract without transforming it automatically
into a permanent employment status as it was stated by the previous law. Wahba,
2009 studied the impact of this law on informality in Egypt and concludes that labor
flexibility introduced by this law increases formal employment. All these laws and
reforms show how costs of entry and governance indicators in Egypt have changed
overtime. This can help us to understand the development and the characteristics
of the Egyptian informal market.
3 Econometric Issues
From the data base, we know who belongs to formal and informal market, and
who is unemployed but the information which is missing is the share of people inside
each informal segment if this informal sector is heterogeneous. The first step is to
determine the optimal number of segments into which the informal sector could be
divided, this will be the number and size of the informal segments that best describe
the data. The model will give us the probability of belonging to each segment
of the informal sector and the returns to individual characteristics. The second
step will consist on comparing these probabilities to theoretical ones assuming that
workers are earning maximizers to answer our question about the choice or obligation
characteristic of the informal sector in Egypt. The third step will be to compute
individual probabilities in order to understand more the characteristics of each group
of the labor market.
To estimate the unknown partition of informal employment, it is not possible to
use traditional parametric methods, since we estimate simultaneously the regression
parameters, and the partition. That is why the most adapted method to model
the heterogeneity of the informal sector will be to apply a the mixture models re-
gressions to estimate parametric combinations of parametric laws, whose weights
are not known. This method allows identifying homogeneous segments of informal
workers in the sense that the Mincer equation is the same for all who belong to
the same segment. For each segment of the labor market, we have a different wage
equations. We assume that the number of segments is j, and thus density is less
than the number of observations, which is to capture an unobserved heterogeneity
between groups (discrete) rather than individual (continued). As our main interest
in this paper is to test the heterogeneity of the informal population in Egypt, we
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will assume that the formal sector is homogeneous. Our informal sector will be a
mixture of different groups. In our case, individuals who are employed in formal and
informal activities are known, unemployed are also known, but the segments which
constitute the informal sector are unobservable, the mixture model will help us to
identify them, if they exist.
For this purpose, we follow the specification model of Gu¨nther and Launov (2012).
The labor market, denoted Γ, if heterogeneous, is characterized by J segments and
each segment is characterized by a gain equation whose specificity is captured by
the returns β of the individual characteristics.
ln yij = x
′
iβj + uij, i ∈ Γj, ui ∼ N(0;σj) (1)
Where yij is the wage of individual i in segment j. We suppose that there is no
correlation for errors across segments as each distribution is independent from the
other. This means that the earning distribution within the segments are different
and independent one another, and also the earning function and the returns (βj) to
individual characteristics (xi) varies from segment to segment.
To the extent that the sample of individuals for whom we observe wage is not
necessarily random, the estimation of wage equations in each of the segments may
be affected by selection bias: we have no information in our sample for those who
are not employed ( non-random sample), so the corresponding observations cannot
be used when estimating the wage equation. In order to take that into account this
selection bias, we consider that individuals’ decision to work is a function of personal
characteristics zi (Heckman 1979), as follows:
yis = z
′
iγ + uis, uis ∼ N(0; 1) (2)
z′i contains the personal characteristics that affect the decision of working or
being unemployed. If the errors from the wage equation and the selection equation
are correlated, the estimation of β is biased. Under the assumption that the joint
dynamics of these errors follows a bivariate normal distribution, their correlation is
equal to ρ . We apply the Bayes rule on conditional probabilities in order to write
the distribution of earnings in each sector of the labor market. For the setup of the
model, please see Gu¨nther and Launov, 2012.
The conditional distribution of wages for the entire labor market is deduced from
the conditional distributions of observed wages in each segment, with a weighting by
the relative size of each. However, none of it is observed. Nevertheless, it is possible
to estimate the probability of belonging to a certain segment so that each segment
is composed of homogeneous workers in terms of the relationship that links wages
to individual characteristics.This probability can be written: P (i ∈ Γj) = πj, ∀j
where πj is the probability of any individual i to belong to any segment yj.





πjf(ln yi|yis > 0, θj) (3)
This model is a finite mixture with sample selection. Ahamada and Flachaire
(2008) describes mixture models as a problem of missing data, when we have a sample
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and we do not know from which group each individual comes from. The estimation
will give the unknown parameters when considering the likelihood of each individual
to belong to each sub group. The reason why we consider the mixture models is
because they link the parametric estimation with the no-parametric estimation. If
we take the extreme values: j=1, the mixture model will be reduced to a single
parametric function. When we add more j’s the heterogeneity of the population will
be taken into consideration. The other extreme will be j=n the number of groups
we have is equal to the number of observations, the mixture will be reduced to an
estimation of a density with the kernel density estimation method (non-parametric).
For all j’s between 1 and the sample size n, the mixture model will be a semi-
parametric model. The model is estimated with a Limited information maximum
likelihood and the covariances have been corrected (Murphy and Topel, 1985)
4 Empirical application
4.1 Data
We apply this model to the case of Egypt. The data used is the ELMPS database
for the year 2006. The survey is representative 1 and is carried out by the Economic
Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with the Egyptian Central Agency for public
mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). The fieldwork for ELMPS06 was carried
out from January to March 2006. The final sample consists of 8,349 households.
The surveys provide a rich source of information on labor market conditions of
individuals. They collect information on the characteristics of jobs such as on the
presence of legal job contract and social security coverage.
Our analysis is conducted on the population of working age. Our sample includes
(15-64) workers who are remunerated positively. Also, the database provides infor-
mation on earnings only for waged employees, even if employers and self-employed
are usually remunerated, we could not include them in our sample, and we are aware
of this limitation. This leaves us with 19983 observations.
The definition used for informality is the ILO definition: Not having any contract
or social security. This is the statistic definition of informal employment approved
in 2003 in the 17th international conference of labor statisticians. These jobs are
divided into formal and informal employment due to the characteristics of occupied
jobs. The criterion of non-affiliation to social security allows identification of informal
jobs. More precisely, all the workers who are not affiliated with any social security
and who do not have any contract are considered informal.
Figure 1 show kernel densities of monthly earnings in formal and informal sectors
in 2006.
The graph shows an important difference in the mean earnings between the two
sectors, this was confirmed by the descriptive table: on average formal workers
are more paid than informal workers. Another interesting result shows that some
informal workers earn more than the formal ones, also the densities of formal and
1See Assaad and Roushdy (2009) for the construction of the weights and Barsoum (2006) for
the documentation on the data collection process
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informal log-earnings are significantly different.
Table 3 contain descriptive statistics of all the variables used in both the wage
and selection equations. The wage gap between formal and informal workers reaches
44%. Most of the workers (formal or informal) are male, and most of the unemployed
are female. This is due to the society effect and the fact that women usually take
care of the children and the house, while the husbands go to work. The average
age for formal workers is 39 years, while it is only 30 for unemployed and it is
even lower for informal workers (29 years). This means that the informal sector
attracts younger workers. 33% of the formal sample is highly educated while only
7% of the informal workers attained high education. Tenure is the highest in the
formal sector (12 years) but it is not insignificant in the informal sector (9 years)
this means that informal workers can keep their jobs for a considerable period of
time. And finally, half of the informal workers come from a rural area while only
32% of the formal employees come from this region. Additional variables are used
in the selection equation: household size, the number of active members of the
household, and finally, the marital status. These variables should affect the decision
of participating or not in the labor market depending on individual opportunity
cost of not participating, but they are not supposed to affect the earnings. One
interesting finding is about the percentage of married people in each group. 77.73%
of the formal workers are married, while only 39.62% of the informal one are in
couple. Single have less responsabilities to worry about if they are employed on an
informal basis. One can ask the question of the origin of formal vs informal workers:
whether they belong to the very same category right from the beginning of their
tenure. 32% (1506) of the formal workers were informal in their previous job. This
can suggest that previous jobs for these employees were temporary or small jobs
until they find an adequate one where they become formal. Only 3.5% (97) of the
informal workers were formal in their previous job. Even after dropping these people
from the sample (supposing that they are temporary informal and are looking for a
formal job elsewhere), the results remain unchanged.
4.2 Choice of the number of segments
The first step in the implementation of the mixture models regression is to study
the composition of the labor market. We know who belongs to the formal sector,
but as we study the heterogeneity in the informal sector, we do not observe the
affiliation of individual to the segments of the informal labor market. To choose the
ultimate number of segments, different methods can be applied depending on our
interest. As our principal interest is to estimate a density, the more adequate and
simple method is to select the number of segment that minimizes the information
criteria: Akaike (AIC), consistent Akaike (CAIC), Schwarz (SBC). Table 1 shows
that for 2006, a two-segment informal market model is preferable to the model
with homogeneous informal market. However, adding a third informal sector does
not improve the specification in terms of information criteria. We conclude that
the partition into two-segments is the best fitting model for the labor market .
9
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Table 1: information criteria to select the model 2006
Homogenous 2 sectors 3 sectors
AIC 32105,9 31745,8 31783.4
CAIC 32327,5 32046,6 32163.3
SBC 32228,2 31937,3 32044.0
AIC :Akaike Information Criteria; CAIC:
Consistent Akaike; SBC: Schwarz
4.3 Empirical results
Table 5 present the results of the estimations. Informal 1 and informal 2 are the
different segments in the informal sector.
The coefficient of correlation (rho) is significant. This shows how important it
is to take into consideration the sample selection into the labor market when we
estimate the coefficients of the wage equation.
The expected earnings in formal sector are much higher than those of the two
segments of the informal market. In addition, workers, who belong to the first
informal sector are in average better paid than workers in the second informal sector.
(8% more approximatively)
Furthermore, for the size of the informal segments, one constitute 33,2% of the
whole labor market and the second one is considerably smaller (3,2%). It is true
that one of the sectors is small but the reason why it is important to take it into
consideration and treat it as a separate segment is the result we will see below that
28,7% of workers would have earned more if they worked in this sector. Table 6 in
the appendix shows that this small informal sector is different from the rest of the
sample but the difference is not outrageous.
Returns on education and tenure are the most significant in the formal sector.
High education, even if not significant become negative in the higher paid segment
of the informal sector. The medium education appears to have no influence at all
in both informal sectors. Males are better paid than women in all the sectors.
However, the discrimination between the wage of females and males is lower in the
formal sector. This can be explained by the existence of some kind of control in
the formal sector that prevents this kind of discrimination. Of course, this control
is absent in the informal sectors. Another possible explication is that women who
work in the formal sector could have better education and experience.
Location in urban regions have positive significant impact in the formal sector
and the well paid informal sector but the impact is larger for the formal workers.
This can be simply due to the fact that formal firms pay better in the urban areas
because of their big sizes and large benefits.
The variable age is positive and significant in all the sectors, but especially in
the lower paid informal one, younger workers are better off.
We can conclude that each of these segments shows a different pattern of returns
to individual characteristics. But we can not conclude yet anything for the entry
barriers which can exist between these sectors. The second step will be to answer
the question on whether the distribution of workers between the three sectors is a
10
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question of choice, in this case we have a competitive market where everyone is free
to choose the sector he wants to work in, or it is a question of obligation where entry
barriers segment the market and people would work in a certain sector but if they
had a choice, they would be working elsewhere.
4.4 Choice or obligation?
Table 2: Actual and potential (earnings maximizing) distribution of individuals
across sectors 2006
πˆj π˜j πˆj/π˜j [Bootstrap 95% conf. int.]
Formal 0,63 0,47 1,34 [ 0,84 ; 2,07 ]
Informal1 0,34 0,24 1,41 [ 1,40 ; 3,30 ]
Informal2 0,03 0,29 0,10 [ 0,05 ; 0,56 ]
πˆj : Estimated weights of the actual distribution. π˜j : Estimated weights of the earnings
maximizing distribution. Weights ratio πˆj/π˜j distribution is obtained by bootstrap.
To shed light on the segmented and competitive character of the Egyptian labor
market, the distribution of probability issued from the mixture model regressions
with two segments (for 2006) is compared to the one resulting from a maximizing
behavior of income by workers. The latter is obtained by computing the percentage
of individuals in each segment for whom, given their individual characteristics, their
income would be the highest in this segment:
P(i∈ yj) = P (E[log yij|yis ≻ 0;xi] = max
l,l∈[1,J ]
{E[log yil|yis ≻ 0;xi])}. (4)
So we identify for each individual, the segment in which his income is the highest,
then for each segment we compute the proportion of individuals. If the estimated
probabilities and theoretical probabilities are equal this means that individuals are
in the segment that gives them maximum earnings, and therefore there is no barriers
to enter the different segments of the Egyptian labor market. In this case, we can
say that the labor market is competitive.
πˆj is the actual estimated probabilities π˜j is the earning maximizing probabil-
ity. Table 2 show that in Egypt, the distribution of the estimated probabilities
is different from the one which can be deduced from a behavior of maximization
of the revenue. 17% of formal workers would be better paid in the informal sec-
tor depending on their individual characteristics, but we still do not know if they
would be better paid in the first informal segment or the second one. There is also
a difference in both probabilities for each informal sector. In the high paid informal
sector, approximatively 24% are actually working in this sector but only 33% are
earning their maximum wage in this sector. So some people would earn more in
the formal sector or the low paid informal sector. The second surprising result is
11
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for the second informal sector which constitutes only 3.3% of the whole labor mar-
ket. If no barriers exist, 29% of workers would be better paid in this sector. The
first impression one may have is that in developing countries, characterized usually
by high unemployment, corruption and high level of poverty, people’s only concern
is to find a job, no matter if it is formal or informal, but one can ask if that is
true for the whole population. Is there any psychological cost for being informaly
employed? Now, if the psychological effect does not matter for Egyptian informal
workers, financial penalties can be very heavy. But corruption is very high in Egypt,
and control if it exists, bribes can be paid to arrange the situation. However, The
results found in this paper where the majority of the population would earn more
in the informal sector, but still work formally or in another informal sector, suggest
that these moral and financial penalities are important for some people in Egyptian
society. Also workers could be maximizing utility and not only their income. The
can chose to work informally because it can be easier and more flexible even if they
know that the wage is higher in the formal sector.
We can conclude that the hypothesis of free entry is not respected. But these ta-
bles give us only a general idea.In an attempt to understand more the characteristics
of each group, we classify each individual in his group to see common characteristics
of individuals belonging to the same group.
4.5 Posterior probabilities
Using the estimated model and given the observed earnings, we can assess the
probability that an individual belongs to each particular sector according to the
formula:




This gives us a mean to identify the sector where each particular individual
belongs to with a high probability. We superpose the results of this classification
with the data on the individual-specific maximum potential earnings sectors obtained
in the previous section. Table 4 quantifies the cohorts of people that chose their
segment of work by obligation: the first column contains the “cohort” codes, the
fist letter of each (F,I1,I2) designing the segment where individuals are actually
employed, and the second letter designing the sector where these individuals would
be paid the most given their individual characteristics (e.g. F-F is the group of
formal workers who could not earn more by changing sector of employment, F-I1 are
the formal workers who would earn more if they worked in the first informal sector
I1, etc.). In Gu¨nther and Launov (2012) and Bensidoun and Bensalem (2012), more
people would like to work in the formal sector than the number of people who
already work there but we do not know if these people are actually working in the
first informal sector or the second. Maybe if we knew who belongs to each group, we
could understand the reasons why people took such decisions, and if they are really
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obliged to stay in their sector or it is their personal choice. 2
From our results, it is obvious that the distortions to the earnings maximizing
distribution of individuals are important. For example more than 35% of formally
employed would be better off working in the second (smaller) informal segment,
while more than half of informally employed individuals could earn more at the
formal job market. This shows that there is virtual cost specific to each sector,
impeding earning maximizing reshuﬄes. When we compute the average and total
loss of wages due to non-earnings-maximizing sectors choice, we can see that the
biggest average wage loss is experienced by some formal workers who do not work in
their optimal informal sector: I2 and also for informal workers belonging to I1 who
do not work in I2. This findings contradict the view, partially expressed in Gu¨nther
and Launov (2012), that major distortions to the efficient distribution of workers
stem from barriers to entry in the formal segment, and favor the non-monetary
costs/benefits explanation.
5 Conclusion
In 2006, workers are overestimated in the formal sector, an opposing result to
the one found by Gu¨nther and Launov (2012) for the Coˆte d’Ivoire sample, and the
one found by Bensidoun and Bensalem (2009) for the Turkish data. Obviously, even
if the average earning in the formal sector is higher than the informal one , for some
individuals, depending on their characteristics, it can be more profitable for them
to work in the informal sector. But they do not. These barriers to entry could be
explained in this case as a risk aversion, some people do not dare to work in black
because they fear either moral or financial penalties. Another explanation is the
no-financial benefits offered to legal workers as stability, and also since 2003, more
flexibility, reliable contracts and more rights (to strike per example) were offered
to legal workers by the law 12 and this is not offered by the informal jobs. In this
case, the assumption made here would be that workers maximize their utility and
not their income. So for the formal workers, employment in Egypt appears to be an
employment of choice. As for informal workers who could earn more in formal jobs,
these barriers can simply be the lack of job opportunities in the formal sector; For
these people, it is an employment of obligation, and for other informal workers, it is
an employment of choice because of the financial and no-financial advantages offered
by the informal market. Another interesting conclusion concerns the wage gap size
for those formal workers who optimally would work in the informal sector, this wage
gap was not big enough in order to attract them to take risks and work informally.
The non-monetary benefits offered by formal jobs after the law 12 as stability and
no moral judgment compared to informal employment are particularly important to
offset the financial gap.
Finally, to reduce informal employment in the case the microeconomic recom-
mendation militate in favor of more control on the informal sector, a maintenance of
2For instance, if we find that people who belong to I2-F live in rural regions and are married
and educated, we can understand that the reason why these people do not work in their optimal
sector is that it is costy for them to migrate and find a job in the city because they are already old
and have a family in their villages.
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the law 12 of 2003 in order to give more benefits to legal workers and to keep them
outside the informal sector and to create more job opportunities. Policymakers will
need to reduce the costs and burdens of entering the formal economy. Some inter-
esting extensions would be to find exactly where do these virtual prices come from,
we made hypothesis to explain the results but our model do not allow us to conclude
firmly on the reasons why the Egyptian workers are not distributed in their optimal
sectors. Is it the transportation problem, is there risk aversion, is it fiscal evasion?
what are exactly the virtual prices of being in one or another sector?
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.1003
Kernel density estimate
Figure 1: Density of monthly log-earnings
Source: ELMPS(2006), author’s computations
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for 2006
Total Inactive Formal Informal
Population 19983 12,545 4695 2747
Sample (%) 100 61,78 23,49 14,73
Monthly wage (in L.E) 678.66 0 809.28 455.09
Variables in wage equation
Sex(male=1, %) 55,01 24,71 73,14 89,54
Age (years) 32,52 30,86 38,96 29,08
Education %
Low 36,68 41 18,62 47,79
Interm. 48,51 49,32 48,46 44,91
High 13,95 8,36 32,91 7,04
Tenure 4,1 0 12,21 9,08
Region %
Urban 57,82 56,93 67,11 50,53
Rural 42,18 43,07 32,89 49,47
Exclusion variables
Active HH members 1,25 0,94 1,67 1,89
HH size 5,29 5,41 4,85 5,52
Marital Status %
Married 57,33 50,31 80,49 49,84
Single 37,13 42,36 16,25 48,92
Divorced/Widows 5,54 7,33 3,26 1,24
Source: ELMPS(2006), author’s computations. ”‘Total” refers to individuals between 16 and 65
Table 4: Number of workers who could gain more in each group and average and
total loss for 2006
Groups N % Average Loss wage Total loss wage
F-F 2459 52,37 0 0
F-I1 567 12,08 39,13 22187,59
F-I2 1669 35,55 261,46 436379,1
I1-F 964 36,32 79,08 76239,01
I1-I2 479 18,05 273,12 130825,8
I1-I1 1211 45,63 0 0
I2-F 37 41,57 176,8 6543,9
I2-I2 20 22,47 0 0
I2-I1 32 35,96 136,99 4383,74
Source: ELMPS(2006), author’s computations
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Table 5: Mixture Model for Heterogeneous (2 segments) informal sector 2006
Formal Informal1 Informal2
coeff. (std. error) coeff. (std. error) coeff. (std. error)
intercept*** 4,945 0,151 intercept*** 4,175 0,114 intercept** 2,284 1,077
sex*** 0,285 0,030 sex*** 0,710 0,043 sex** 0,650 0,282
age** 0,016 0,008 age*** 0,058 0,006 age** 0,159 0,064
age2 0,000 0,009 age2*** -0,071 0,009 age2** -0,212 0,090
educMd*** 0,230 0,029 educMd -0,003 0,025 educMd 0,256 0,234
educHigh*** 0,487 0,033 educHigh -0,073 0,049 educHigh** 1,050 0,466
tenure** 0,004 0,001 tenure** 0,004 0,002 tenure -0,018 0,016








Nb. Active*** 0,780 0,015
Marital status*** 0,880 0,030
sigma*** 0,699 0,007 sigma*** 0,510 0,012 sigma*** 1,321 0,099
rho** -0,073 0,035
probF 0,631 Prob1 0,336 prob2 0,033
ExpectedLog earning 6,230 ExpectedLog earning 5,865 ExpectedLog earning 5,670
Expected earnings 536,090 Expected earnings 364,903 Expected earnings 340,096
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
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Table 6: Summary Statistics
sector inf2 Rest of the sample P.value (pr T>t)
male 76,40% 79,20% 0,268
educM 35,90% 47,29% 0,015
educH 20,11% 23,53% 0,000
urban 41,57% 61,22% 0,000
married 57,30% 69,33% 0,012
lnwage 5,3 6,1 0,000
age 32,59 35,32 0,008
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